公 法 评 论 你们必晓得真理,真理必叫你们得以自由。
Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp. 1-32: Abstract.
Socio-Legal
Positivism and a General Jurisprudence
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA
H.L.A.
Hart described his classic book, The Concept of Law, as a work in ?descriptive
sociology?, and his aspiration was to produce a general jurisprudence. He was
less than successful in achieving both of these aims. This article attempts a
comprehensive reconstruction of legal positivism in a manner that will render
it more compatible with a sociological approach, and more amenable to the
project of general jurisprudence. The label ?socio-legal positivism? reflects
the fact that this article grafts the insights and orientation of socio-legal
theory onto the core tenets of legal positivism. In the course of this
reconstruction, certain traditional views of legal positivists, especially
those regarding the function of law and the nature of the concept of law, are
discarded or modified. A number of Hart's key insights are preserved, but
resituated within a broader framework. And the relationship between legal
positivism and natural law is altered dramatically. The result of this
reconstruction is the foundation for the construction of a general
jurisprudence that better fits the complex and variable situation of law in
society today.
Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp. 59-72: Abstract.
Pepper
v Hart; A Re-examination
JOHAN
STEYN
This
article re-examines the House of Lords? decision in Pepper v Hart, which
relaxed the rule prohibiting courts from using ministerial explanations of
Bills in Parliament in the construction of statutes. It recognizes the
importance of context in the interpretation of statutes, but questions the
assumption in the case that intention can be attributed to Parliament. It
argues that the case can be confined to authorizing the use of ministerial
statements in Parliament when such statements can be shown to be inconsistent
with arguments made by government before the courts on the meaning of the
legislation. Any broader interpretation of the decision raises serious
constitutional objections.