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Moral
Functionalism
Hayek
and Durkheim in Perspective
Jack
Birner
1.
Introduction
The
abandonment of the idea that rules of behaviour and morality are something that
is given for all
time
by some supreme divine or human being or in the more neutral sense of being
unalterable
owes
much to the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. I will discuss the
theories of the
emergence
and function of morality of two authors who, each in his own way, place
themselves in
this
tradition: Friedrich Hayek and Emile Durkheim. Durkheim challenges a part of
the intellectual
tradition
that Hayek strongly identifies with, and Hayek takes up the challenge. A
discussion of
their
different approaches will lead us to some fundamental issues concerning the
role of moral
rules
in society.
Durkheim’s
challenge consists in his attempt to create sociology as a social science in
its own right,
independent
from economics. He does so in his first book, De la division du travail social
(DTS,
1893)1. Durkheim’s strategy relies
on a comparison of the two pillars of the thought of the father of
the
then dominant political economy, Smith. The message of The Wealth of Nations is that the
pursuit
of self-interest together with the division of labour lead to increased
efficiency and
economic
growth. The
Theory of Moral Sentiments argues
that what makes a civil society possible
is
sympathy, the human capability of
imagining the others’ position. So, sympathy is based on the
similarity of human beings. The division
of labour, on the other hand, presupposes that humans are
different. The new science of sociology
will have justified itself if it succeeds in resolving this
contradiction.
This is what Durkheim sets out to do. He seeks an open confrontation with
classical
political
economy by declaring that the
most important consequence
of the division of labour is not
efficiency,
but solidarity: “les services économiques qu'elle peut rendre sont peu de chose
à côté de
l'effet
moral qu'elle produit, et sa véritable fonction est de créer entre deux ou
plusiers personnes un
sentiment
de solidarité.” (DTS, p. 19) [“the economic
services that it can render are picayune
compared
to the moral effect that ir produces, and its true function is to create in two
or more
persons
a feeling of solidarity.”, p. 56].2
Half
a century later, Hayek responds to the challenge, putting knowledge and its
limits forward as
the
principal explanatory factors: “All the possible differences in men’s moral
attitudes amount to
little,
so far as their significance for social organization is concerned, compared
with the fact that all
man’s
mind can effectively comprehend are the facts of the narrow circle of which he
is the center;
that,
whether he is completely selfish or the most perfect altruist, the human needs
for which he can
effectively
care are an almost negligible fraction of the needs of all members of society.”
(ITF, p.
1
Except
when stated otherwise, in the case of Durkheim page references are to Durkheim
1893 (1994). The translation
is
taken from Durkheim 1933 and is given in []. References to Hayek’s three
volumes of Law,
Legislation and Liberty
(1973-79)
will be given as LLLI, II, or III.
2
Because
the doctrine that specialization leads to more efficient production derives
from The
Wealth of Nations,
Durkheim’s
project is also a provocation of economists in that it implyies they “did not
know their Smith” in the sense
that
they neglected The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
2
14).3 Still later, he goes a step
further by denying that sociology has a right to exist as a scientific
discipline:
“however grateful we all must be for some of the descriptive work of the
sociologists,
for
which, however, perhaps anthropologists and historians would have been equally
qualified,
there
seems to me still to exist no more justification for a theoretical discipline
of sociology than
there
would be for a theoretical discipline of naturology apart from the theoretical
disciplines
dealing
with particular classes of natural or social phenomena.” (LLLIII, p. 173).4 Not only is
economics
enough to explain why the interaction of millions of individuals creates an
orderly and
stable
social structure instead of resulting in total chaos; it is also the only discipline that is capable
of
showing how the rules governing property and honesty have evolved so as to
create a stable
system
of co-operation that maximizes the amount of information that is accessible to
these
individuals.5 The pursuit of self-interest
in a market society is the rule of behaviour that is necessary
and
sufficient for this. Hayek criticizes Durkheim’s explanation of co-ordination
and co-operation
in
terms of morality interpreted as altruism: “This confusion [of identifying
altruism with morality]
stems
in modern times at least from Emile Durkheim, whose celebrated work The Division of
Labour
in Society …
shows no comprehension of the manner in which rules of conduct bring about
a
division of labour and who tends, like the sociobiologists, to call an action
‘altruistic’ which
benefits
others …” (LLLIII, p. 205). Hayek also
attributes to Durkheim the “constructivist” idea that
the
faculty of reason enables man to successfully design and change social
institutions and
processes
according to his desires.6
The
severity of Hayek’s criticism might lead one to expect that his theory of
society is radically
different
fromDurkheim’s. But that is far from the truth. On the contrary, they have many
elements
in
common. For instance, both share the idea that most social institutions evolve
spontaneously, and
that
their evolution has consequences that no one ever intended. For both, the
relationship between
the
individual and society is an important item on their research agenda. Both
dwell at length on the
relationship
between scientific analysis and morality, and both come to the conclusion that
a moral
system
is the outcome of an evolutionary process, and that imposing rules of conduct
that are not
adapted
to the individuals with their specific capacities in their specific historical
situation has a
destabilizing
effect. 7
The question why
Hayek nevertheless brands Durkheim as one of the bêtes
noires
of social
theorizing will be discussed at the end of this chapter. Let us first give a
summary
of
Hayek’s and Durkheim’s theories of society, in preparation of a comparison
between their views
on
morality.
2.
The spontaneous evolution of social institutions
Even
though in the 1940s Hayek abandons technical economics and starts developing a
theory of
society,
this does not constitute a clean break in his thought. From his economics he
retains the
emphasis
on co-ordination. The idea of the market as a co-ordinating device is
generalized to all
3
Both
the content and the phrasing of ITF (for instance, “amount
to little” is an almost literal translation of Durkheim’s
“sont
peu de chose”) strongly suggests that it is a direct reaction to Durkheim. If
this the case - as I think it is - the
question
remains why Hayek does not refer to him. (Due to the speed with which Birner
& Ege 1999 was written and
pubished,
we failed to eliminate the sentence on p. 764 in which we wrongly say that he
does.)
4
This
is very similar to Menger’s idea about the relationship between his own
(“exact”) economic theory and the
historical
and statistical methods of the German Historical School, which only produce
descriptions of concrete
phenomena
and processes. For a discussion, cp. Birner 1990.
5
Hayek
says so explicitly in a text that will be discussed more at length below, “The
origins and effects of our morals: a
problem
for science”, an unpublished ms. in Box 96/126 of the Hayek Archives at the
Hoover Institution of War,
Revolution
and Peace, Stanford. It is the text of a lecture, which was apparently
delivered between the publication of
the
third volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty in 1979 and The
Fatal Conceit in 1988. I will refer to it as Origins.
6
Saying
that this is shown by his insistence on social solidarity. Cp. LLLII,
p.
186, n. 9. What Hayek means by
solidarity
is discussed below, in section 6.
7
The
question of the relationship between Hayek’s and Durkheim’s theories of society
is discussed further in Birner &
Ege
1999.
3
social
institutions as co-ordinating devices. They have evolved as the unintended
consequences of
individual
actions. Another idea from his economics, viz. that individuals have only
limited
knowledge
- they only know their immediate environment, and most of that knowledge is
implicit -
comes
to play an increasingly important role.8 What he keeps from his earlier
work in psychology9
is
the concept of self-organization. Hayek adds to this an evolutionary
perspective that becomes
more
prominent from about 1960, when The Constitution of Liberty was published, but whose
origin
can also be traced back to his psychology. In many articles10 and in the three volumes of
Law,
Legislation and Liberty Hayek
constructs a theory that describes social institutions as mostly
spontaneously
evolved, relatively stable patterns of behaviour or rules that co-ordinate the
interaction
among individuals. Institutions embody the accumulated, mainly implicit and
temporally
and
spatially limited knowledge of individuals and their ancestors. These
institutions are the
survivors
of a selection process. That is why they contain more knowledge than any single
human
being
can ever dispose over or make explicit. That is how institutions enable
individuals to survive
in
a highly complex environment. Deliberate interventions risk destroying this
accumulated
experience
of the past.
In
the course of social evolution, individuals have become used to, or, through
adaptation,
practically
forced to, suppress a large part of the behavioural instincts that were
adequate to the
small
and primitive groups of hunters and gatherers whose members all know each other
personally.
Interaction
through markets has taught individuals (in an implicit, non-theoretical way) to
accept the
anonymous
interaction patterns that are characteristic of modern society. This “Great
Society”, as
Hayek
calls it, relies on abstract rules that regulate the behaviour of millions of
individuals who all
pursue
the interests of themselves and of their immediate friends and relatives. The
modern market
society
has evolved in a process of variation and selection. In The Constitution of
Liberty the
process
of variation is presented as originating with courageous individuals trying
out, at their own
risk,
new forms of behaviour that may go against the norms and laws of their social
environment.
This
is the same process that we find in Mandeville.11 As to selection, Hayek rejects
social
Darwinism
on the grounds that it builds upon the selection of innate capacities of
individuals
instead
of culturally transmitted rules embodied in institutions. In its stead he
proposes group
selection.
This has been criticized as being inconsistent with (Hayek’s own)
methodological
individualism.
I will not go into this criticism here, except for pointing out that group
selection
solves
a problem that arises within the hayekian framework: it explains why certain
moral rules
were
adopted despite that fact that they were “infringing or repressing some of the
innate rules and
replacing
them by new one which made the co-ordination of activities of larger groups
possible.”
(LLLIII, pp. 160-1). 12
Hayek’s
last contribution to social science is his theory of cultural evolution. Although
it is
announced
by that name in the Epilogue of the final volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty (1979),
it
had made its appearance at least as early as 1967, in “Notes on the Evolution
of Systems of Rules
of
Conduct” (Notes,
Hayek 1967).
Its last more or less systematic exposition can be found in the
first
chapter of The
Fatal Conceit (FC) of 1988. In biological
evolution acquired features cannot be
8
Hayek’s
contribution to the debate on socialism in the 1930s is the platform where he
elaborates the importance of
limited
knowledge.
9
Which
dates from 1920. Hayek’s theory of perception is an early precursor of neural
network models. Hayek explains
the
human mind as a self-organizing system of decentralized, parallel distributed
neural connections. For more details
about
the relationships between Hayek’s psychology and the rest of his work, cp.
Birner 1999.
10
Cp.
the collections Individualism and Economic Order (1948) and Studies
(1967).
11
For
an excellent discussion, cp. Bianchi 1994.
12
The
criticism that Hayek’s theory of group selection is non-individualistic can be
found, for instance, in Vanberg
1986.
The solution proposed in the text (and in Birner 1999b) constitutes also a
reply to the criticism that Hayek does
not
propose a mechanism through which individuals are motivated to co-operate when
this is not in their immediate
self-interest.
Cp. Bianchi 1994, Shearmur 1994, and Witt 1994.
4
inherited.
In a social evolution, however, they can. Cultural evolution involves the
transmission of
behaviour
patterns and information to offspring, not only from parents, but from
innumerable other
ancestors
as well. This Lamarckian process of instruction makes cultural evolution much
faster than
biological
evolution. Another difference is that in cultural evolution selection does not
function
through
”the immediately perceived effects of actions that humans tend to concentrate
on” but
“rather,
selection is made according to the consequences of the decisions guided by the
rules of
conduct
in the long run [which depend] chiefly on rules of property and contract
securing the
personal
domain of the individual.” (FC, p. 76). This leads Hayek to
the idea of group selection. On
the
other hand, biological and cultural evolution are similar in that both consist
of a continuous
adaptation
to unforeseeable circumstances. There are no laws of biological and cultural
evolution,
and
both involve the same principles of selection, viz., survival or reproductive
success.
The
comparison with biology leads Hayek to the conclusion that there are three main
types of
evolution
in human affairs: genetic evolution, which produces instincts and instinctive
behaviour,
the
evolution of rational thought, and cultural evolution. In time, culture comes
after instinct and
before
reason.13
Instinctive
behaviour is sufficient for the co-ordination of the actions of individuals
within
small primitive groups, the members of which have common perceptions and
objectives and
are
motivated by the instinct of solidarity. On the other hand, within the advanced
or “abstract”
society
(the “extended order”), which is too complex to be fully understood by the
human mind, coordination
is
ensured by abstract rules that have developed gradually. These rules govern
private
property,
honesty, contracts, exchange, commerce, competition, profit, and the protection
of
privacy.
They are transferred by tradition, learning, and imitation. There is a
continuous tension
between
the rules governing individual behaviour and those governing the functioning of
social
institutions.
The formation of supra-individual systems of co-ordination have forced
individuals to
change
their natural or instinctive reactions: “Disliking these constraints so much,
we can hardly be
said
to have selected them; rather these constraints selected us: they enable us to
survive.” (FC, p.
14).14 The institutions that emerge
are the result of certain individuals stumbling upon solutions to
particular
problems in a process of competition. Every type of evolution operates through
competition,
which acts as a process of discovery. However, each type of environment or
stage of
society
requires its own type of rules, and following the rules that were adapted to
one environment
in
a different one may lead to disaster. This is particularly the case with small,
primitive groups and
modern
extended society. “If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed rules of the
micro-cosmos
...
to the macro-cosmos (our wider civilisation) ... we would destroy it. Yet if we
were always to
apply
the rules of the extended order to our intimate groupings, we would crush
them.” (FC, p. 18).
Let
us now turn to the theory of society of De la division du travail social. A summary will do for
now
as we will come back to Durkheim’s sociology in the section on functionalism.
Whereas for
Hayek,
at least until 1960, the individual is the methodological starting point of all
social theorizing,
for
Durkheim it is the social framework. Without it, all the individualistic
elements that classical
economics
has adduced for explaining the rise and success of industrialized market
societies, such
as
the pursuit of self-interest and competition, are centrifugal forces. Society
is based on
“association”,
the sharing by individuals of hereditary or geographical characteristics.
Social
density
makes for co-operation, and not until a co-operative framework exists can the
market and
other
social institutions start playing their co-ordinating role. In a piece of
conjectural history that
has
a similar function as in Hayek, Durkheim shows the evolution of society from
the primitive
tribe,
whose members are completely similar and which is ruled by the same collective
conscience
that
is orientated towards concrete circumstances, to the highly diversified modern
industrial
13
Hayek
writes that this is also the case logically and psychologically (FC, p. 23). It
is not entirely clear what he means
by
this.
14
This
neglects the problem of incentives. Cp. Witt 1994 and Shearmur 1994. Cp. also
the conclusion of Birner & Ege
1999.
5
society,
where individuals identify with their professional group rather than with
society as a whole.
In
the beginning were the hordes, homogeneous primitive
tribes. They are kept together by a type of
social
cohesion that rests on similarity. The second stage in the development is primitive society,
which
consists of a repetition of identical hordes. Next in the course of evolution
are segmentary
societies. They arise due to a
diversification that takes place as soon as one individual (by a
mutation
that Durkheim does not explain) distinguishes himself from his fellow-men by
his
leadership
capacities. Even though the authority of these clan chiefs is a new element,
similarity is
still
the only basis of social cohesion or solidarity. These societies are regulated
by repressive
law,
which
imposes sanctions on infringements of the values and rules that are shared by
all members.
There
is no place for individual personality. The form of social cohesion that rules
these societies is
mechanical
solidarity.
This
starts to change with the increase in geographical and social density. The fact
that the members
of
society now have to keep track of a greater number of individuals makes it
necessary for
collective
conscience to come to terms with more abstract spatial and social
relationships. This
involves
a weakening of the hold of tradition. It also marks the birth of abstract
thought, which is an
additional
source of variations among individuals. It also creates greater individual liberty
which
together
with the rationalization of society underlies the process of specialization, in
which
mechanical
solidarity is gradually replaced by a different form of cohesion, organic solidarity. The
transition
is reflected in the legal system; repressive law, which punishes infractions on the
common
social code, gives more and more way to restitutive law, a system of rules that
regulate
how
torts can to be put right.15
Although
the analysis of law has an important place in the work of both, its function is
different.
Durkheim
arrives at it via a methodological consideration. Solidarity is a moral
concept, and as
such
it cannot be observed. It can only be investigated indirectly (cp. DTS, p. 28), through the legal
system.
It is the empirical manifestation of the state of solidarity in society because
it is the system
of
binding rules that have been developed to suppress conflicts,. In Hayek’s work,
the legal system
is
important for two different reasons. First, because it constitutes the body of
rules that enables the
market
order to function. Second, because it is a prime example of a spontaneously
evolved system
of
rules. The legal system is the set of “institutions that Western man has
developed to secure
individual
liberty.” (CL, p. 5). Hayek’s treatment of
law is also more limited than Durkheim’s in
that
he concentrates almost exclusively on property law. For Durkheim property law
belongs to the
part
of restitutive law which he calls negative: it is based on abstention and links
a thing to a person.
Positive
restitutive law, or the law of co-operation, is the set of the rules that
regulate co-operation.
It
is this positive restitutive law that increases in importance as we come closer
to modern society.
Durkheim
wants to explain how the complex process of the division of labour and the
concomitant
emergence
of social cohesion could have taken place without anyone, or any central organ,
consciously
organizing it so as to result in a relatively stable social system. His
fascination by
spontaneous
evolution is shared by Hayek, who arrives at the same cautious,
non-interventionist
consequences
as Durkheim, as we will see in the next section.
15
What
Hayek has to say on the passage from primitive to modern society is very
similar. He even speaks of the role of
magic
and ritual in passing from one economic order to another through the relaxation
of prohibitions (LLLIII, p. 161).
Cp.
also what he says about sharing in primitive societies: “But these habits had
to be shed again to make the transition
to
the market economy and the open society possible. The steps of this transition
were all breaches of that `solidarity`
which
governed the small group and which are still resented. Yet they were the steps
towards almost all that we now
call
civilization.” (LLLIII, p. 161).
6
3.
A social science of morality
The
relationship between scientific analysis and morality is something Durkheim is
concerned with
from
the very beginning of his scientific career. He writes in DTS that the scientific
explanation of
norms
and values is his main objective; morality is “un ensemble de faits acquis
qu’il faut étudier”
(DTS, p. XL) [“a collection of
facts to study”, p. 35] and not “une sorte de législation toujours
révocable
que chaque penseur institue à nouveau.”(ibid.) [“a sort of revocable law-making
which
each
thinker establishes himself”, p. 35]. Durkheim harnesses this legal and moral
anti-positivism to
his
strategic goal of launching sociology. DTS is an investigation into the moral
effects of the
division
of labour. The concept of morality not only involves the study of rules of
behaviour, it also
encompasses
the idea of J.S. Mill of social science as moral science, the disciplines that
involve the
mental
attitudes of individuals.16 For Durkheim moral refers to the linking of conscience (or
consciousness)
among individuals, something which economics with its narrow focus on
selfinterest
as
the source of human action cannot explain:
“[S]i
l'intérêt rapproche les hommes, ce n'est jamais que pour quelques instants; il
ne peut
créer
entre eux qu'un lien extérieur. Dans le fait de l'échange, les divers agents
restent en
dehors
les uns des autres, et l'opération terminée, chacun se retrouve et se reprend
tout
entier.
Les consciences ne sont que superficiellement en contact; ni elles se
pénètrent, ni
elles
n'adhèrent fortement les unes aux autres. Si même on regarde au fond des
choses, on
verra
que toute harmonie d'intérêts recèle un conflit latent ou simplement ajourné.
...
L'intérêt
est, en effet, ce qu'il y a de moins constant au monde.” (DTS, pp. 180-1)
[“if
interest relates man, it is never for more than a few moments. It can create
only an
external
link between them. In the fact of exchange, the various agents remain outside
of
each
other, and when the business has been completed, each one retires and is left
entirely
on
his own. Consciences are only superficially in contact; they neither penetrate
each other,
nor
do they adhere. If we look further into the matter, we shall see that this
total harmony of
interests
conceals a latent or deferred conflict. … There is nothing less constant than
interest.”,
pp. 203-4]
But
there is more to the meaning of morality. Moral is what serves a certain social
function: “tout
fait
d’ordre vital – come sont les faits moraux, - ne peut généralement pas durer
s’il ne sert à
quelque
chose, s’il ne répond à quelque besoin… “( p. XLI) [“each vital fact – and a
moral fact is
vital
– cannot endure if it is not of some use, if it does not answer some need…”, p.
35]. The
“quelque
chose”, the need the satisfaction of which is the function of morality, is the
subject of
DTS. Durkheim summarizes it at
the end of the book: “Est moral … tout ce qui est source de
solidarité,
tout ce qui force l’homme à compter avec autrui, à régler ses mouvements sur
autre chose
que
les impulsions de son égoïsme, et la moralité est d’autant plus solide que ces
liens sont plus
nombreux
et plus forts.” (DTS, p. 394) [“Everything which
is a source of morality is moral,
everything
which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces
him to
regulate
his conduct through something other than than the striving of his ego is moral,
and morality
is
as solid as these ties are numerous and strong.”, p. 398].
The
various connotations of the concept of morality are merged in Durkheim’s idea
that attempts to
improve
the social world are conditional on a scientific analysis of the mechanisms by
which it is
ruled.
This leads him to be very cautious about the possibility of intervention. One
must start by
presuming
that a certain status quo responds to a particular need: “tant donc que la
preuve contraire
n’est
pas faite, il a droit à notre respect.” (DTS, p. XLI) [“until the opposite is proved
true, such vital
facts
are entitled to our respect.”, p. 35]. If we must intervene in the moral
sphere, it is better to do
16
Cp.
for instance he passage further on in the book to the extent that “[t]oute
société est une société morale." (DTS p.
207),
which clearly reveals the influence of Mill, whose “moral sciences” is the
translation of the German
“Geisteswissenschaften”.
7
so
piecemeal, basing ourselves upon scientific analysis: “l’intervention est …
limitée: elle a pour
objet,
non de faire de toutes pièces une morale à coté ou au-dessus de celle qui
règne, mais de
corriger
celle-ci ou de l’améliorer partiellement. Ainsi disparaît l’antithèse que l’on
a tenté d’établir
entre
la science et la morale…” (ibid.) [“the intervention is … limited; it has for
its object, not to
make
an ethic completely different from the prevailing one, but to correct the
latter, or partially to
improve
it. Thus, the antithesis between science and ethics … disappears.”, pp. 35-6].
In
the case of Hayek, the scientific explanation of the emergence of moral rules
appears rather late
as
an explicit item on the research agenda. In his published work it is mentioned
for the first time in
the
concluding chapter of Volume III of Law, Legislation and Liberty of 1979. However, he had
discussed
the subject at least as early as 1944, in The Road to Serfdom (particularly in chapter X),
and
more extensively in 1945, in “Individualism: True and False” (ITF). There, his main premise is
that
“without principles we drift.” (ITF, p. 2). The question “Is there anywhere a consistent
philosophy
to be found which supplies us not merely with the moral aims but with an
adequate
method
for their achievement?” (ibid.) is answered affirmatively. The philosophy is
that of the
Scottish
Enlightenment, which Hayek distinguishes sharply from the French constructivist
tradition
to
which he reckons Durkheim to belong. In the Introduction I have already
mentioned that Hayek’s
rejection
of Durkheim is odd in view of the many parallels with his own thought. They
extend to
Hayek’s
thought on morality. Hayek shares with Durkheim the idea that the peculiarity
of the social
sciences
lies in the fact that they deal with mental phenomena. The whole of CRS is devoted to
exploring
the consequences of the fact that they are moral sciences. Another important
point of
agreement
is that morality is a gradually and spontaneously evolved system of rules of
conduct that
we
must not intervene with at all, or at the most piecemeal.
The
emergence of rules of behaviour is the subject of Notes. By studying rules of behaviour in an
evolutionary
context the link between science and morality is tightened. The article focuses
on the
function
of moral rules for increasing the predictability and hence the stability of the
social
environment:
“The
knowledge of some regularities of the environment will create a preference for
those
kinds
of conduct which produce a confident expectation of certain consequences, and
an
aversion
to doing something unfamiliar and fear when it has been done. This creates a
sort
of
connection between the knowledge that rules exist in the objective world and a
disinclination
to deviate from those rules commonly followed in action, and therefore
between
the belief that events follow rules and the feeling that one ‘ought’ to observe
rules
in
one’s conduct.” (Hayek 1967, p. 80).
This
leads to the conclusion that “[t]he factual belief that such and such is the
only way in which a
certain
result can be brought about, and the normative belief that this is the only way
in which it
ought
to be pursued, are thus closely associated.” (ibid., p. 80). That Hayek does
not defend a moral
naturalism
can be concluded from the last footnote. It contains the suggestion
(interesting but not
elaborated)
that the descriptive or explanatory rules on which individuals base their
behaviour in
society
“may be meaningful only within a framework of a system of normative rules.”
(Hayek
1967,
p. 81, n. 20).
Hayek
intended to work out the project of a scientific explanation of morals in The Fatal Conceit.
As
we have seen above, it contains the elements of a theory of cultural evolution
that tries to
develop
the ideas in Notes.
The most
important additions are that culture, and hence morality,
constitutes
a level of evolutionarily emerged rules that is situated between instinct and
reason, and
that
the success of a particular social order can be measured by the number of
individuals it can
keep
alive. The project was never finished; FC is a patchwork of brief chapters and
appendices
8
without
the sense of unity that characterizes Hayek’s earlier books. No doubt this is
due to the fact
that
Hayek’s health was deteriorating and that the book was written together by Bill
Bartley.17
I will
therefore
discuss a text that was certainly written by Hayek himself, and that shows more
coherency,
the Origins
manuscript
referred to above.18 Hayek
writes there that the problem of the
scientific
study of cultural evolution (and hence, we may add, of morality) threatened to
become
unmanageable
until he introduced group selection. Cultural evolution depends on it. This
explains
why
our morals provide us with the means of adapting to unforeseen and
unforeseeable conditions
for
which reason is insufficient. In this context, Hayek refers to the collective
mind in the sense of
the
moral rules the members of a social group have in common. Even though this
collective
conscience
remains in permanent interaction with the minds of the individuals, it is
different from
the
contents of individual minds, and it has an autonomous existence. This is very
similar to
Durkheim’s
idea of collective conscience. Hayek chooses a non-Darwinian evolutionary
framework
for
dealing with the complexity of the origin of morals. Durkheim, too, is critical
of an application
of
Darwinism to social processes.19 Hayek addresses the same problem as Durkheim: how social
evolution
in a non-Darwinian process creates moral values.
4.
Functionalism
La
division du travail social is
as much a methodological manifesto as a theory of society. I have
already
mentioned that it serves to establish sociology as an independent discipline.
The other sense
in
which the book is methodological is that it is intended as an exercise in
functional explanation.
On
the first page of Book I Durkheim defines function as
“le
rapport de correspondance qui existe entre ces mouvements [vitaux] et les
besoins de
l’organisme.
… Se demander quelle est la fonction de la division du travail, c’est donc
chercher
à quel besoin elle correspond; quand nous aurons résolu cette question, nous
pourrons
voir si ce besoin est de même nature que ceux auxquels correspondent d’autres
règles
de conduite dont le caractère moral n’est pas discuté.” (DTS, p. 11) [“the relation
existing
between these [vital] movements and corresponding needs of the organism. … To
ask
what the function of the division of labor is, is to seek for the need it
supplies. When we
have
ansered this question, we shall be able to see if this need is of the same sort
as those to
which
other rules of conduct respond whiose moral character is agreed upon.”, p. 49]
This
might suggest that Durkheim subscribes to a theory in which final causes are a
central element.
He
also distinguishes between normal and abnormal forms of social life. Usually,
such a distinction
immunizes
a theory against falsifications, turning it into a piece of metaphysics, or
worse, a
tautology.
This suspicion is fed, for instance, by what Durkheim writes on p. 343: “Si,
normalement,
la division du travail produit la solidarité sociale, il arrive cependant
qu’elle a des
résultats
tout différents ou même opposés.” [“Though normally the division of labor
produces social
solidarity,
it sometimes happens that it has different, and even contrary results.”, p.
535]. Does
Durkheim’s
functionalism makes his theory empirically empty? To see whether this is the
case, let
us
examine his procedure in more detail. Durkheim discusses three examples of an
anomalous
17
Bartley’s
influence shows in the many references to religion, something Hayek had never
paid much attention to.
18
Cp.
Note 5.
19
Cp.
DTS, p. 174: “Si
les hypothèses de Darwin sont utilisables en morale, c'est encore avec plus de
réserve et de
mesure
que dans les autres sciences. Elles font, en effet, abstraction de l'élément
essentiel de la vie morale, à savoir de
l'influence
modératrice que la société exerce sur les membres et qui tempère et neutralise
l'action brutale de la lutte pour
la
vie et de la sélection. Partout où il y a des sociétés, il y a de l'altruisme,
parce qu'il y a de la solidarité.” [“If the
hypotheses
of Darwin have a moral use, it is with more reserve and measure than in other
sciences. They overlook the
essential
element of moral life, that is, the moderating influence that society exercises
over its members, which tempers
and
neutralizes the brutal action of the strugle for existence and selection.
Wherever there are societies, there is
altruism,
because there is solidarity.”, p. 197].
9
division
of labour. The first is that of industrial or economic crises. They represent a case where
the
division
of labour fails to produce solidarity. In general, if the relationships among
the various
organs
that make up society are not regulated in the sense that the division of labour
has created a
sufficiently
developed system of rules, then that society is in a state of anomie. This is due to the
fact
that these organs have not been in contact with one another sufficiently or for
a sufficiently
long
period. Another possible cause is that the organs are separated by a dark zone,
a “milieu
opaque”,
so that the rules cannot establish in sufficient detail the conditions of
equilibrium. In that
case,
“Les
relations, étant rares, ne se répètent pas assez pour se determiner; c’est à
chaque fois
nouvelle
de nouveaux tâtonnements. Les lignes de passage suivies par les ondes de
mouvements
ne peuvent pas se creuser parce que ces ondes elles-memes sont trop
intermittentes.20 Du moins, si quelques règles
parviennent cependant à se constituer, elles
sont
générales et vagues; car, dans ces conditions, il n’y a que les contours les
plus généraux
des
phénomènes qui puissent se fixer. Il en sera de même si la contiguité, tout en
étant
suffisante,
est trop récente ou a trop peu duré.” (DTS, p. 360-1) [“Relations, being rare, are
not
repeated enough to be determined; each time there ensues new groping. The lines
of
passage
taken by the streams of movement cannot deepen because the streams themselves
are
too intermittent. If some rules do come to constitute them, they are, however,
general
and
vague, for under these conditions it is only the most general contours of
phenomena that
can
be fixed. The case will be the same if the contiguity, though sufficient, is
too recent or
has
not endured long enough.”, p. 369]
In
those conditions, with the growth of industry and the market becoming
practically unlimited,
producers
can no longer see all relevant factors directly, production proceeds unfettered
and gets
out
of control; it can only proceed by random “tâtonnements”.21 The different organization of
industry
that would be needed to cope with this has not kept pace with the very rapid
changes, so
that
the various conflicting interests have not yet found the time to find a new
equilibrium. (DTS, p.
362).
In order for the division of labour to have a non-disequilibrating effect, the
worker must not
lose
his fellow workers from sight, so that he is aware of the effects he has on
them and they on
him.
The labourer is thus not a machine that repeats itself,22 but he feels that he is useful
(“sert”). In
order
for that to be possible, he need not be able to survey large parts of the
social horizon; it is
sufficient
that he sees enough of it to understand that his actions have a goal that lies
outside
himself
(an external goal, DTS, p. 365).23
The
second example of an anomalous division of labour is “la division du travail
contrainte”, forced
division
of labour.
Durkheim observes that the existence of rules is not enough, for sometimes the
rules
are the cause
of the
anomaly, for example in the case of class struggle (DTS, p. 368). In order
20
The
association that the reader may make with a neurophysiological metaphor would
be justified. Durkheim devotes
several
sections to this. A discussion of the relationship between Durkheim’s and
Hayek’s theories of society with
neurophysiological
models goes beyond the scope of the present chapter. For the case of Hayek, the
reader is referred to
Birner
1996.
21
The
use of the term is probably a deliberate evocation (provocation?) of Walras.
22
Cp.
the contribution of Bensaïd, this volume, who takes up this issue in a
criticism of Hayek.
23
Durkheim’s
triumphant criticism of “the economists“ that they failed to see this certainly
does not apply to Hayek,
who
emphasizes exactly the limited scope of individuals’ perceptions and the
division of knowledge: “Les économistes
n’auraient
pas laissé dans l’ombre ce caractère essentiel de la division du travail et,
par suite, ne l’auraient pas exposées
à
ce reproche immérité, s’ils ne l’avaient réduite à n’etre qu’un moyen
d’accroitre le rendement des forces sociales, s’ils
avaient
vu qu’elle est avant tout une source de solidarité.” (DTS, p. 365)
[“The economists would not have left this
essential
character of the division of labor in the shade and, accordingly, would not
have exposed it to this unmerited
reproach,
if they had not reduced it to being merely a means of increasing the produce of
social forces, if they had seen
that
it is above all a source of solidarity.”, p. 373]. For further discussion, cp.
Birner & Ege 1999.
10
for
the division of labour to create solidarity, it is not enough that everybody
performs his task, but
also
that that task suits him (“convient”). The division of labour must be adapted
to the natural
distribution
of talents: “La seule cause qui détermine alors la manière dont le travail se
divise est la
diversité
des capacités. …. Ainsi se réalise de soi-même l’harmonie entre la constitution
de chaque
individu
et sa condition.” (DTS, 369) [“The only cause
determining the manner in which work is
divided,
then, is the diversity of capacities. … Thus, the harmony between the
constitution of each
individual
and his condition is realized of itself.”, p. 376]. Compare also DTS, p. 370, where he
writes:
“La contrainte ne commence que quand la réglementation, ne correspondant plus à
la nature
vraie
des choses, et, par suite, n’ayant plus de base dans les moeurs, ne se soutient
que par la force.”
[“Constraint
only begins when regulation, no longer corresponding to the true nature of
things, and,
accordingly,
no longer having any basis in customs, can only be validated through force.”,
p. 377].
Durkheim
speaks in this context of spontaneity: “par spontanéité, il faut
entendre l’absence, non pas
simplement
de toute violence expresse et formelle, mais de tout ce qui peut entraver, même
indirectement,
le libre déploiement de la force sociale que chacun porte en soi.” (DTS, p. 370) [“by
spontaneity
we must understand not simply the absence of all express violence, but also of
everything
that can even indirectly shackle the free unfolding of the social force that
each carries in
himself.”,
p. 377]. And “le travail ne se divise spontanément qui si la société est
constitutuée de
manière
à ce que les inégalités sociales expriment exactement les inégalités
naturelles.” (DTS, p.
370)
[“labor is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way
that social
inequalities
exactly express natural inequalities.”, p. 377].
The
third anomalous type of the division of labour is the lack of functional
activity,
which can be
characterized
as a lack of a particular type of co-ordination of the functions. The
continuity with
which
the various functions interact and need one another has to keep pace with the
increased
division
of labour; they must feel their interdependence. (DTS, p. 387). To specialize more means to
work
harder (ibid.). However, if – for instance as a consequence of a wrong central
organization
within
an enterprise or a society - the various specialized functions do not have
enough to do, this
causes
defects in their co-ordination. Working harder constitutes
“une
nouvelle raison qui fait de la division du travail une source de cohésion
sociale. Elle ne
rend
pas seulement les individus solidaires, comme nous l’avons dit jusqu’ici, parce
qu’elle
limite
l’activité de chacun, mais encore parce qu’elle l’augmente. Elle accroît
l’unité de
l’organisme,
par cela seul qu’elle en accroît la vie; du moins, à l’état normal, elle ne
produit
pas
un de ces effets sans l’autre.” (DTS, pp. 389-90) [“a new reason why the division of
labor
is a source of social coheson. It makes individuals solidary, as we have said
before, not
only
because it limits the activity of each, but also because it inceases it. It
adds to the unity
of
the organism, solely through adding to its life. At least, in its normal state,
it does not
produce
one of these effects without the other.”, p. 395].
This
passage makes it particularly clear that the main function of Durkheim’s
anomalies is to clarify
the
content of his theory of social cohesion. The conclusion of the discussion of
Durkheim’s
anomalous
forms is therefore that they serve to give his theory more rather than less
empirical
content.
Nor do final causes have a role to play in Durkheim’s functionalism. Functional
is that
which
arises spontaneously, as a solution to the complexity of life in society. The
division of labour
“consiste
… dans le partage de fonctions jusque là communes. Mais ce partage ne peut être
exécuté
d’après un plan préconçu; on ne peut dire par avance où doit se trouver la
ligne de
démarcation
entre les tâches, une fois qu’elles seront séparées; car elle n’est pas marquée
avec
une telle évidence dans la nature des choses, mais dépend, au contraire, d’une
multitude
de circonstances. Il faut donc que la division se fasse d’elle-même et
progressivement.”
(DTS, p. 260) [“consists in the
sharing of functions up to that time
11
common.
But this sharing cannot be executed according to a preconceived plan. We cannot
tell
in advance where the line of demarcation between tasks will be found once they
are
separated,
for it is not marked so evidently in the nature of things, but depends, on the
contrary,
upon a multitude of circumstances. The division of labor, then, must come about
of
itself
and progressively.”, p. 276].
Let
us now turn to Hayek’s method. Above, in the discussion of his theory of
society and moral
rules,
I have indicated the importance of the concept of social institutions as the
unintended
consequences
of individual actions, and of the contribution of both individuals and
institutions to
the
maintenance of the social framework as a whole. Even though Hayek never puts
these ideas in
terms
of individuals and institutions serving the goal of stability, his theory has a
strong
functionalist
ring to it. Is it functionalist? Since Hayek is always very explicit about his
own
methodology,
the first place to turn to for an answer are his many methodological and, of
course,
The
Counterrevolution of Science (CRS). Hayek never describes himself as a functionalist.24
However,
chapter VIII in CRS
on
“”Purposive” social formations” leaves no doubt that he accepts
the
main tenets of functionalism. He mentions the notion of unintended
consequences, i.e., the fact
that
human actions often have functions from the one for which they were undertaken.
Furthermore,
phenomena
such as individual freedom and tacit knowledge are mentioned as serving to
maintain a
particular
social framework:
“If
we survey the different fields in which we are constantly tempted to describe
phenomena
as
“purposive” though they are not directed by a conscious mind, it becomes
rapidly clear
that
the “end” or “purpose” they are said to serve is always the preservation of a
“whole”, of
a
persistent structure of relationships, whose existence we have come to take for
granted
before
we understood the nature of the mechanism which holds the parts together. The
most
familiar
instances of such wholes are biological organisms. Here the conception of the
“function”
of an organ as an essential condition for the persistence of the whole has
proved
to
be of the greatest heuristic value. (CRS, pp. 81-2)
By
emphasizing the as-if character of many social explanations, Hayek defends a
sophisticated
functionalism.
He does not reject the use of explanations that employ purposive of
functionalist
concepts:
“It is easily seen how paralyzing an effect on research it would have had if
the scientific
prejudice
had banned the use of all teleological concepts in biology and, e.g., prevented
the
discoverer
of a new organ from immediately asking what “purpose’ or “function” it serves.”
(CRS,
p.
82). He is against using them in an anthropomorphic sense:
“As
the terms of ordinary language are somewhat misleading, it is necessary to move
with
great
care in any discussion of the “purposive” character of spontaneous social
formations.
The
risk of being lured into an illegitimate anthropomorphic use of the term
purpose is as
great
as that of denying that the term purpose in this connection designates
something of
importance.
In its strict original meaning “purpose” indeed presupposes an acting person
deliberately
aiming at a result. The same, however, …. is true of other concepts like “law”
or
“organization”, which we have nevertheless been forced, by the lack of other
suitable
terms,
to adopt for scientific use in a non-anthropomorphic sense. In the same way we
may
find
the term “purpose” indispensable in a carefully defined sense.” (CRS, p. 81)
The
analogy with biology is recommended as useful for social science. This does not
imply an
endorsement
of organicism, as is shown by his rejection of historicism in CRS.25 This is closely
24
Nor
do any of his commentators. Only Vanberg 1986 mentions it.
25
Cp.
also his rejection of the idea of society as mind-like in Hayek 1967, p. 74
12
related
to Hayek’s use of conjectural history, which is a typically functionalist
device.26
Hayek calls
it reconstruction.27 Every reconstruction is a
reconstruction in the light of some point of view, or of
some
function; without this anchoring
device, a reconstruction would be pointless (if not
impossible).
Hayek is very clear about this in Notes. There the method of conjectural history is
described
as
“the
reconstruction of a hypothetical kind of process which may never have been
observed
but
which, if it had taken place, would have produced the phenomena of the kind we
observe.
The assumption that such a process has taken place may be tested by seeking for
as
yet
unobserved consequences which follow from it, and by asking whether all regular
structures
of the kind in question can be accounted for by that assumption.” (Hayek 1967,
p.
75)
This
is yet another defence of a counterfactual or as-if approach, one that even
aims at producing
testable
implications. This method is merged with a functionalist approach in two
intervening steps.
One
is the argument that the social sciences differ from the natural sciences in
that the complex
structures
which they study are in their turn composed of other complex structures, viz.
the sets of
rules
behaviour of individuals who are equipped with a mind. The second step is the
introduction of
an
evolutionary process in which rules of behaviour have been selected by their
adaptedness to the
system.
Again, Hayek’s conclusion is a defence of functionalism:
“This
implies a sort of inversion of the relation between cause and effect in the
sense that the
structures
possessing a kind of order will exist because the elements do what is necessary
to
secure
the persistence of that order. The ‘final cause’ or ‘purpose’, i.e., the
adaptation of the
parts
to the requirements of the whole, becomes a necessary part of the explanation
of why
structures
of the kind exist: we are bound to explain the fact that the elements behave in
a
certain
way by the circumstance that this sort of conduct is most likely to preserve
the
whole.
…. A ‘teleological’ explanation is thus entirely in order so long as it does
not imply
design
by a maker …” (Hayek 1967, p. 77)
The
conclusion is that Hayek is a functionalist.28 Not only that, like Durkheim,
he is a sophisticated
functionalist
who is fully aware of the dangers a literal interpretation of the notion of
function or
purposiveness
has, and who for that reason relies on the tools of counterfactual
reconstruction and
evolutionary
explanation. Now we have the ingredients to examine Durkheim’s and Hayek’s
theories
of morality.
5.
Functional morality
But
before proceeding to a comparison between Hayek’s and Durkheim’s thought on
morality, a
problem
must be addressed that has remained latent so far. It concerns the question
what it is that
we
compare. In the case of Durkheim I have limited myself mainly to DTS, whereas in the case of
Hayek
the picture is composed of elements borrowed from various episodes in his
development that
vary
from ITF
of 1945 to FC of 1988. On a number of issues
Hayek’s thought seems to evolves (for
instance
on the importance of individual freedom as a moral value), whereas on others he
seems to
be
more constant. I “solve” this problem radically by reconstructing Hayek’s
thought on morality in
the
most coherent way possible, even though I shall occasionally discuss its
evolution where I think
it
useful to do so. This may not be satisfactory from a purely historical point of
view. However, I
think
the possible disadvantages of this approach are compensated by the gains in
understanding of
26
Pettit
calls this the missing mechanism type of explanation. Cp. Pettit 1996.
27
Cp.
CRS, p. 85.
28
Cp.
also LLLI, p. 149, n.
15.
13
the
role of morality in society as a problem in its own right that I hope will
result from the
comparative
discussion of Durkheim and Hayek.
Let
us begin by comparing the methods Hayek and Durkheim employ in developing their
theories
of
morality. Both attempt to find an uncontestable, or at least an uncontested,
basis for morality. For
Durkheim
it is the rule that commands us to realize the essential characteristics of
the collective
type
(DTS, p. 393). Since these have
been defined by Durkheim as solidarity, it follows that moral
rules
“énoncent les conditions fondamentales de la solidarité sociale”(DTS, p. 393) [“enunciate the
fundamental
conditions of social solidarity.”, p. 398]. And since solidarity rests on the
division of
labour,
the latter “devient du même coup la base de l’ordre moral.” (DTS, p. 396) [“becomes, at the
same
time, the foundaton of the moral order.”, p. 401]. So, because it is a
fundamental characteristic
of
man that he is a social being, morality is that which is conducive to the
establishment and
strengthening
of social cohesion. Hayek shares the idea that morality is that which rest on,
or
follows
from, human nature. He adopts this idea from the philosophy of the Scottish
Enlightenment,
or
as he calls it, “true individualism”: “The great concern of the great
individualist writers was … to
find
a set of institutions by which man could be induced, by his own choice and from the motives
which
determined his ordinary conduct, to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others
....”
(ITF, pp. 12-13, emphasis added).
In later writings this is elaborated into the criterion of the
survival
of the greatest number of individuals as the value by which a particular social
order should
be
judged. Underlying this idea is a peculiar logical argument: since morals
regulate human
relationships,
there can be no morality without human beings. This is supplemented by two
arguments
that we find in Origins. The first is that morals are
rules of behaviour that have been
accepted
by individuals because they have been exposed to them long enough, even though
they do
not
understand their rationale. If a sufficiently large number of individuals
accepts the moral rules,
keeping
to them becomes an advantage because of the network externalities (as they
would now be
called)
they create. The second argument is aimed against all egalitarian moral
systems. If, says
Hayek,
we had enforced social justice in the sense of an equitable distribution of
property, we
would
never have reached the current state of development in which many more people
are born
and
survive than would have been possible in an egalitarian society. So, those who
defend an
equitable
distribution of property and income (i.e. the socialists) have not understood
that the
apparently
unjust principle of “several property” is more beneficial than an equal
distribution, under
which
the masses of the poor would have been far smaller, not because more people
would belong
to
the haves instead of the have-nots, but simply because many fewer people would
be alive.29
So,
the
existence of morality logically presupposes the existence of (at least two)
human beings, and
therefore
life is a necessary condition for morality. Hayek concludes from this that
morals are not
idealistic
but materialistic, since their function is to keep us alive.30
Durkheim
uses the same type of argumentation. It can be summarized as follows. All
social science
is
moral science; its basic ingredients are intentionality and relatively stable
mental constructs
individuals
somehow share. This presupposes that they interact regularly. This in turn
presupposes
the
existence of a social framework, which again presupposes the existence of
solidarity, which
implies
the existence of rules of behaviour that allow individual mental attitudes to
be made
compatible
with one another. So in the case of both authors we have a peculiar mix of
logical,
methodological,
and theoretical arguments that sustain their theories of morality. But even
though
their
procedures for finding the foundations of morality are very similar, Hayek and
Durkheim
come
to different conclusions as to its content. For Durkheim morality is everything
that keeps man
from
being selfish31
and favours
co-operation. Hayek rejects
unselfishness,
at least as a moral value
29
Basically,
this is the same argument as in introduction to Capitalism and
the Historians of 1954.
30
Cp.
Origins, p. 17.
31
Cp.
the passage from DTS, p. 394 which was quoted in the fourth
paragraph of section 3. Cp. also DTS, p. 404:
Morality
“nous demande seulement d’être tendres pour nos semblables et d’être justes, de
bien remplir notre tâche, de
14
of
the market order,32 and
emphasizes the value of co-ordination.33 For Durkheim, society has a
mitigating
effect on egoism.34 For
Hayek self-interest (in the extended sense of caring also for one’s
immediate
social environment35)
is the value that holds the order of the market together and makes
it
work. Everything that is aimed at taking away this motivation (and Hayek
singles out all
proposals
that are based on the promotion of altruism) jeopardizes the continued
functioning of the
market
order.
In
summary, Hayek and Durkheim both explain the function of moral rules by using conjectural
history. Both are moral functionalists. They share the central idea
that the
function of moral rules is
to
preserve the stability of the social framework, though they give it a different
content. For Hayek,
the
system of morals serves to keep the greatest possible number of people alive.
For Durkheim
morality
has the function of maintaining social cohesion. In addition to these
similarities, let me
indicate
several others. For both authors moral rules rest on the way in which our fellow
citizens
judge
our behaviour.36 A further common element is
that moral
rules involve a cognitive
dimension.37 Another shared characteristic
is their empiricism
in the sense
that a theory of morality
should
be empirically testable. For instance, in Origins Hayek criticizes hedonism,
utilitarianism
and
egalitarianism by saying that they have never been put to the test of
determining whether they
help
to maintain or to improve the survival of the group.38 The ultimate test for any
system of moral
rules
lies in the number of individuals it can keep alive.39In Durkheim we find a similar
empiricist
strand.
Scientific method relies on observation. Solidarity is a moral concept, and as
such it is
unobservable.
That is why Durkheim studies its most important empirical manifestation, the
legal
system.
There is a second sense in which Durkheim and Hayek share an empiricist
approach. Both
travailler
à ce que chacun soit appelé à la fonction qu’il peut le mieux remplir, et
reçoive le prix juste de ses efforts.” [
only
asks that we be thoughtful of our fellows and that we be just, that we fulfill
our duty, that we work at the function
we
can best execute, and receive the just reward for our services.”, p. 407].
32
Cp.
LLLIII, p. 165: “
Its mores involved withholding from the known needy neighbours what they might
require in
order
to serve the unknown needs of thousands of unknown others. Financial gain
rather than the pursuit of a known
common
good became not only the basis of approval but also the cause of the increase
of general wealth.” The criticism
of
social justice is the subject of Law, Legislation and Liberty.
33
Cp.
LLLIII, p. 164:
“This exchange society and the guidance of the co-ordination of a far-ranging
division of labour
by
variable market prices was made possible by the spreading of certain gradually
evolved moral beliefs which, after
they
had spread, most men in the Western world learned to accept.” For a discussion
of Hayek and Durkheim as
representatives
of explanations of social stability that are based on co-ordination and
co-operation, cp. Birner & Ege
1999.
34
DTS, p. 396:
“cette pression salutaire de la société, qui modère son égoïsme [de l’homme] et
qui fait de lui un être
moral.”
[“this salutary pressure of society which moderates his egoism and makes him a
moral being.”, p. 401]. On p.
401
Durkheim generalizes the argument: “La seule puissance qui puisse servir de
modérateur à l’égoïsme individuel est
celle
du groupe; la seule qui puisse servir de modérateur à l’égoïsme des groupes est
celle d’un autre groupe qui les
embrasse.”
(DTS, p. 401) [“The
only power which can serve to moderate individual egotism is the power of the
group;
the
only power which can serve to moderate the egotism of groups is that of some
other grup which embraces them.”, p.
405].
35
Cp.
section 6 below.
36
Cp.,
for instance, LLLIII, p. 171: “All morals rest on the
different esteem in which different persons are held by their
fellows
according to their conforming to accepted moral standards. It is this which
makes moral conduct a social value.”
And
Durkheim: “Voilà ce qui fait la valeur morale de la division du travail. C’est
que, par elle, l’individu reprend
conscience
de son état de dépendence vis-à-vis de la société ... puisque la division du
travail devient la source éminente
de
la solidarité sociale, elle devient du même coup la base de l’ordre moral.” (DTS, p. 396)
[“This is what gives moral
value
to the division of labor. Through it, the individual becomes cognizant of his
dependence upon society … since the
division
of labor becomes the chief source of social solidarity, it becomes, at the same
time, the foundation of the moral
order.”,
p. 401].
37
Durkheim
observes that solidarity, the main social value, is only operative if
individuals are aware of its existence.
(DTS
259-60). Hayek’s idea that a major function of moral rules in creating a more
predictable social environment has
already
been discussed.
38
Cp.
Origins, p. 11.
39
This
corroborates the idea of Shearmur 1996, ch. 5, and Aimar, this volume, that
Hayek looks for a testable criterion
by
which to judge a social order, and that this criterion is biological.
15
emphasize
that in order for individuals to accept moral rules, they must be exposed to
them long
enough.40
6.
The cement of the social universe
In
the above, Durkheim’s emphasis on solidarity and altruism has repeatedly been
contrasted with
Hayek’s
idea that the pursuit of self-interest is the force that keeps society
together. It is now time
to
go into the details of what Hayek means by self-interest, and what its place
is. In ITF
Hayek
stresses
“the value of the family and all the common efforts of the small community and
group …
local
autonomy and voluntary associations …” (p. 23). In short, the intermediate
groups, the hold of
which
is negatively correlated with the rate of suicide in Durkheim’s Suicide. So, the integration of
the
individual in the intermediate groups is a direct empirical measure of social cohesion. For
Hayek,
however, the function of these groups lies in their greater efficiency in making individuals
achieve
their goals than the state. Hayek’s idea of solidarity is more restricted than
Durkheim’s, and
he
rejects it as the factor that keeps larger social aggregates together:
“Even
today the overwhelming majority of people, including, I am afraid, a good many
supposed
economists, do not yet understand that this extensive division of labour, based
on
widely
dispersed information, has been made possible entirely by the use of those
impersonal
signs which emerge from the market process and tell people what to do in order
to
adapt their activities to events of which they have no direct knowledge.” (LLLIII, p. 161).
So,
it is the pursuit of the interests of oneself and the members of one’s
immediate social
environment
together with the anonymous price system that makes for co-ordination and
social
stability.
The market order has co-evolved with the system of moral rules that sustains
it: “This
exchange
society and the guidance of the co-ordination of a far-ranging division of
labour by
variable
market prices was made possible by the spreading of certain gradually evolved
moral
beliefs
which, after they had spread, most men in the Western world learned to accept.”
(LLLIII
, p.
164).41 The content of these rules is
economic: providing for the future, accumulating capital, and
seeking
the esteem of fellow-men.
These
are differences
between Hayek
and Durkheim. What they have in common is the problem of
explaining
social stability. Their theories of morality have to be seen in that light. The
function of
moral
rules is to preserve a stable social framework. More specifically, the moral
rules that have coevolved
with
the market order serve to suppress or transform the individual instincts that
still
belong
to the era of the primitive tribe and that have failed to co-evolve with the
increase of the
complexity
of society. Both Hayek and Durkheim propose functional theories of morality.
They use
a
mixed logical-explanatory analysis that starts from an attempt to find the
system of rules that is
accepted
by everyone. They both employ the method of conjectural history without
abandoning the
possibility
of putting their theories to the test. Finally, both add a cognitive dimension
to this
empiricism.
However, they propose different
fundamental
factors that explain social stability. For
Durkheim
they are co-operation and altruism; Hayek emphasizes co-ordination and the
pursuit of
self-interest.
They also differ in their preferences for the political system that is
conducive to social
stabilty.
This is discussed in the next paragraph.
40
For
Hayek’s empiricism in the second sense cp. Birner 1995 and 1999a. Durkheim’s
empiricism is apparent from our
discussion
of the first anomalous type of division of labour in section 4 above.
41
On
the idea of the co-evolution of morals and institutions, cp. also LLLIII, p. 170:
“But as moral views create
institutions,
so institutions create moral views…”
16
7.
Moral theories
The
whole of Durkheim’s intellectual career is inspired by his concern to put
sociology in the
service
of morality. One of the last sentences of DTS reads: “notre premier devoir actuellement
est
de
nous faire une morale” (p. 406) [“our first duty is to make a moral code for
ourselves.”, p. 409)].
Even
though the phrasing would be too constructivistic to Hayek’s taste, the idea is
very similar to
Hayek’s
objective. It is to make man understand that in order to maintain the social
order that brings
so
many benefits, we must change our moral attitudes, and in particular abjure the
morals of
socialism,
since they are based on descriptively false premises. This conditionality of
moral
prescriptions
on facts, which we also find in Durkheim,42 alerts us to an important
feature of
morality
that is often forgotten: moral rules and value judgements are not isolated
entities, but they
are
always embedded in judgments of fact. Each and every moral judgment has
implicit or explicit
factual
premises and presuppositions. It is therefore more appropriate to speak of
moral theories.
One
advantage is that this widens the scope of a rational and critical discussion
of moral rules. Hans
Albert
has elaborated this proposal.43 A principle on which probably all human beings agree44 is
that
it is not reasonable to impose moral rules that one cannot keep to as a matter
of fact: “”ought”
ought
to imply can.” Hayek and Durkheim add a dimension to this by placing morality
in an
evolutionary
perspective, introducing the emergence of moral rules and the consequences they
may
have
for future social developments as legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. The
two authors also
agree
on the general function of morality, which is to preserve the stability of the
social framework.
However,
studying moral judgements as part of moral theories does not alter the fact
that every
moral
theory has at least one value judgment among its premises, since moral
judgments cannot be
derived
from factual ones.45 So
this raises the question about Durkheim’s and Hayek’s moral
premises.
Rather casually Durkheim introduces the brotherhood of man as an uncontested
moral
ideal:
“C’est un rêve depuis longtemps caressé par les hommes que d’arriver enfin à
réaliser dans
les
faits l’idéal de la fraternité humaine.” (DTS, p. 401) [“Men have long dreamt of
finally realizing
in
fact the idea of human fraternity.”, p. 405]. This is linked to solidarity by a
conditional argument:
if
we want brotherhood, then solidarity is a necessary intermediate social norm.
This is reminiscent
of
Hayek’s defence of liberty. In CL the freedom of the individual is presented first and
foremost as
instrumental
to the functioning of the market. Its most important effect is that it creates
the
conditions
under which information and the creative powers of society are mobilized. Hayek
is
aware
that his emphasis on instrumental freedom might be considered as insufficient
for the defence
of
a liberal society:
“Some
readers will perhaps be disturbed by the impression that I do not take the
value of
individual
liberty as an indisputable ethical presupposition and that, in trying to
demonstrate
its
value, I am possibly making the argument in its support a matter of expediency.
This
would
be a misunderstanding. But it is true that if we want to convince those who do
not
already
share our moral suppositions, we must not simply take them for granted. We must
show
that liberty is not merely one particular value but that it is the source and
condition of
most
moral values.” (CL, p. 6)
However,
when we look for those other moral values, again we find an enumeration of
factors that
are
instrumental to the functioning of the market order: abstract rules governing
private property,
honesty,
contracts, exchange, commerce, competition, profit, and the protection of
privacy (cp., for
42
Cp.
above, the first paragraph of section 3.
43
Cp.
Albert 1979, pp. 76-9, where he takes up an idea of Popper’s; cp. Popper 1945,
ch. 24, para. III.
44
All
humans, that is, who do not subscribe to a romantic heroism that considers as
the highest value to demand and do
the
impossible.
45
Notioce,
however, that Durkheim denies that there is a fundamental difference between
moral and factual statements.
Cp.
the next note.
17
instance,
FC, p. 76). So, Hayek does not
really seem to have changed his mind between CL and FC.
What
he has done instead is to unwrap, or render explicit, an idea that had always
been a premise of
his
system of ideas: that the market is the economic system that favours the
material opportunities
for
sustaining the greatest number, and that liberal society is the best
socio-political framework for
the
market.
Durkheim
does not pronounce himself openly in favour of any political system; perhaps he
would
have
found that incompatible with his conception of sociology as the positive
science of morality
and
of himself as a social scientist.46 But it is clear that he favours a system in which
professional
groups
play an important role, without either the state or unfettered competition
being dominant.47
In
other words, Durkheim opposes both liberalism and socialism. If Hayek’s
liberalism and
Durkheim’s
anti-liberalism followed logically as conclusions from their method and
analysis, which
as
I have argued are very similar, these different preferences would be hard to
explain. So the
conclusion
seems inevitable that here we have arrived at different political value
judgments that
inspire
the two authors.
8.
A historical puzzle
This
leaves us with one last question. Hayek accuses Durkheim of constructivism and
of being
opposed
to accepting the outcome of spontaneous social evolutionary processes. He
attributes to
Durkheim
the idea that solidarity is to be obtained by consciously creating and imposing
the
conditions
under which all members of a society could pursue the same goal on which they
all
agree,48 and that moral is that which
furthers altruism. We have seen that a closer reading of
Durkheim
reveals a picture that is almost the exact opposite. Most differences between
the
functional
moral theories of Hayek and Durkheim are differences of degree, not of kind.
Spontaneous
social orders, the importance of free associations, the emphasis on the
emancipation of
the
individual and on individual freedom are prominent features of the theories of
both. So, why
does
Hayek reject Durkheim’s ideas?49
I
propose two alternative explanations. The first is that Hayek interpreted
Durkheim’s emphasis on
the
role of professional groups as a defence of corporatism. For Hayek,
corporatism, whether of the
socialist
or of the fascist kind, is the embodiment of hostility to competition.50 This made him
decide
that a further study of Durkheim would be a waste of time. Consequently, all
the details and
subtleties
of Durkheim’s analysis were lost on him. The second explanation is that Hayek
remembered
that Durkheim stands in the tradition of Comte - without knowing or remembering
that
he
is critical of Comte - and that he is critical of Spencer, who advocates a
particular brand of
liberalism.
For Hayek, criticizing liberalism is tantamount to advocating socialism. Hayek
attributed
this
presumed defence of socialism to Durkheim’s scientific analysis. In both cases,
in order to
make
Durkheim’s presumed defence of corporatism or socialism coherent with that
author’s
46
On
the other hand, he should not have shrunk from making his political preferences
explicit. Cp. Durkheim 1911, in
particular
pp. 138-9: “Comment faut-il donc concevoir le rapport des jugements de valeur
aux jugements de réalité? De
ce
qui précède il résulte qu’il n’existe pas entre eux de différences de nature.”
[“How must the relationship between
value
judgements and descriptions of reality been conceived of? From the preceding
discussion it follows that there is
no
difference of kind between the two.”, my tr.]
47
Cp.,
for instance, the preface to the second edition of DTS, and the
Preface to Durkheim 1928 by Marcel Mauss.
48
Cp.
also LLLII, p. 11,
where Hayek writes that the “Great Society” has nothing to do with solidarity
in the “true”
sense
of conscious unitedness in the pursuit of common goals.
49
Hayek’s
misrepresentation of Durkheim is repeated by Popper: “It is the analysis of
these abstract relations with
which
modern social theory, such as economic theory, is mainly concerned. This point
has not been understood by
many
sociologists, such as Durkheim, who never gave up the dogmatic belief that
society must be analysed in terms of
real
social groups.” (Popper 1945, Vol. 1, p. 175)
50
Cp.
Hayek 1944, p. 30.
18
scientific
analysis, Hayek truncated Durkheim’s analysis of society to the description of
solidarity
in
primitive society. So, in the end, Hayek’s misrepresentation of Durkheim is due
to Hayek’s
attempt
to make Durkheim’s scientific analysis of society and the defence of
corporatism or
socialism
which he, Hayek, wrongly attributed to him, consistent with one another. This
would
explain
why Hayek developed and presented many of his own ideas as if they were a
critical
reaction
to Durkheim. In reality, he rejects many of the very ideas Durkheim rejects,
too. This
“double
negation” explains why Hayek’s theory of society is so similar to Durkheim’s.
9.
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